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Abstract—Recently enacted legislation grants individuals cer-
tain rights to decide in what fashion their personal data may
be used and in particular a “right to be forgotten”. This poses
a challenge to machine learning: how to proceed when an
individual retracts permission to use data which has been part of
the training process of a model? From this question emerges the
field of machine unlearning, which could be broadly described as
the investigation of how to “delete training data from models”.
Our work complements this direction of research for the specific
setting of class-wide deletion requests for classification models
(e.g. deep neural networks). As a first step, we propose linear
filtration as an intuitive, computationally efficient sanitization
method. Our experiments demonstrate benefits in an adversarial
setting over naive deletion schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently enacted legislation, such as the European Unions
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [1], previously
its “right to be forgotten” [2], and the California Consumer
Privacy Act [3] grant individuals certain rights to decide in
what fashion their personal data may be used, and in particular
the right to ask for personal data collected about them to be
deleted.
At present the implementation of such rights in the context
of machine learning models trained on personal data is largely
an open problem. In [4] the authors even conclude that “it
may be impossible to fulfill the legal aims of the Right to be
Forgotten in artificial intelligence environments”.
Indeed, machine learning models may unintentionally mem-
orize (part of) their training data, leading to privacy issues in
many applications, e.g. image classification [5], [6] or natural
language processing [7], and potentially enabling an adversary
to extract sensitive information from a trained model by so-
called model inversion [8].
Informally, deletion of part of the training data from a
machine learning model can be understood as removal of
its influence on the model parameters, in order to obtain a
model that “looks as if it has never seen that part of the data”.
We refer to this process as unlearning. Clearly, the problem
of unlearning can be solved in a trivial fashion, by simply
retraining the model without using the part of the data we
wish to unlearn. For large, real-world models, retraining from
scratch may incur significant computational costs, and may
thus be practically infeasible, if deletion requests are expected
to arrive at any time. We therefore wish to find more efficient
Fig. 1. Results of a model inversion attack for a toy model trained on the
AT&T Faces dataset with 4 classes. For one of the classes, from left to right:
one of the training images, reconstruction of the class by model inversion,
reconstruction after naive unlearning, reconstruction after unlearning by our
proposed method of normalizing linear filtration (defined in section IV). The
reconstructions of the other classes remain visually unchanged by normalizing
linear filtration, see figure 5.
unlearning algorithms, which is notoriously difficult, owing
to the fact that for many popular learning algorithms every
training data point potentially affects every model parameter.
First approaches towards directed unlearning were intro-
duced in [9], and more recently in [10], [11]. In our work
we consider the problem of unlearning in the setting of clas-
sification models for which, in contrast to previous work, we
assume that single individuals own all training data associated
with a particular class, as may be the case e.g. in biometric
applications.
In this setting, we consider classifiers that predict logits, i.e.
(rescaled) logarithmic probabilities that a data point belongs
to certain classes. For such classifiers we propose a novel
sanitization method that applies a linear transformation to
these predictions. For an appropriate hypothesis class this
transformation can be absorbed into the original classifier. The
computation of the transformation requires barely more than
computing predictions by the original classifier for a (small)
number of data points per class. We call this method linear
filtration. Figure 1 shows the results of this method when used
as a defense against model inversion [12].
In summary, the main contributions of our work are:
1) We develop linear filtration, a novel algorithm for the
sanitization of classification models that predict logits,
after class-wide deletion requests.
2) On the theoretical side, we add to the definition of
unlearning in the sense of [10], by proposing a weakened,
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“black-box” variant of the definition, which may serve as
a more realistic goal in practice.
3) As practical methodology, we suggest that the quality of
an empirical unlearning operation may be evaluated in
an adversarial setting, i.e. by testing how well it prevents
certain privacy attacks on machine learning models.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
gives an overview of work related to machine unlearning,
as well the adversarial methodology employed in our ex-
periments. Section III formalizes the unlearning of training
data from machine learning models. Section IV establishes
several variants of our method of linear filtration. Section
V experimentally evaluates linear filtration, primarily in an
adversarial context. Section VI features discussion on the
definition of unlearning.
II. RELATED WORK
Machine unlearning. The term machine unlearning
first appears in [9]. There the authors consider unlearning
the framework of statistical query learning [13]. This allows
them to unlearn data points for learning algorithms where
all queries to the data are decided upfront. However, many
popular learning algorithms (such as gradient descent) query
data adaptively. In the adaptive setting the approach of [9] does
not give any bounds and quickly falls apart if the number of
queries is large, as is the case for neural networks.
[10] features a discussion of the problem of efficient
unlearning of training data points from models, establishes
several engineering principles, and on the practical side pro-
poses unlearning algorithms for k-means clustering. In partic-
ular, they recognize that given the stochastic nature of many
learning algorithms a probabilistic definition of unlearning
(there “deletion”) is necessary. We adopt this view in our work.
[11] propose a framework they refer to as SISA (sharded,
isolated, sliced, and aggregated training), which can be thought
of as bookkeeping method seeking to limit and keep track of
the influence of training data points on model parameters, thus
reducing the amount of retraining necessary upon receiving a
deletion request. This approach comes at the cost of a large
storage overhead.
[14] define -certified removal, “a very strong theoretical
guarantee that a model from which data is removed cannot
be distinguished from a model that never observed the data
to begin with”, a concept akin to that of differential privacy
[15]. Combining this with the idea of influence functions [16],
they then develop a certified removal mechanism for linear
classifiers.
[17], [18] adopt an information theoretic view of unlearning
and develop unlearning operations based on linearized model
dynamics (drawing inspiration from the neural tangent kernel
[19], [20], a technique to describe the gradient descent dynam-
ics of the training of neural networks using kernel methods).
The work done in [14], [17], [18] may be considered
complementary to the method of linear filtration we are going
to develop in this paper, in the sense that they use strong
assumptions (in particular work with linear/linearized models)
obtaining stronger guarantees, while linear filtration is an
intuitive heuristic, largely agnostic to model architecture.
[21] propose a formal framework for verification of ma-
chine unlearning, based on machine learning backdoor attacks.
Membership inference. It is an open problem to find
a suitable measure for the quality of unlearning, when em-
ploying a heuristic unlearning operation with no or weak
theoretical guarantees, i.e. to quantify the remaining influence
of “deleted” training data on a model’s parameters. In our
experiments we thus take ideas from membership inference.
The goal of membership inference is to determine whether a
given data point has been used in the training process of a
given model. A few recent works on membership inference
include [5], [6], [22], [23]. In particular, our adversarial setup
in section V-A draws a large amount of inspiration from [22],
where a binary classifier is trained on the outputs of so-called
shadow models to decide membership.
Model inversion. Broadly, model inversion may be defined
as drawing inferences about private training data from the
outputs of a model trained on this data. The term was intro-
duced in [24]. [12] reconstruct human-recognizable images of
individuals from neural networks trained for face recognition,
using gradient ascend on the input space.
We remark that model inversion is at its core the result of
a correlation between input and output space that is simply
captured by the model (and may exist independently of the
model), and thus does not necessarily constitute a privacy
breach. [25] features a highly recommended elaboration of
this point in much detail.
[22] conclude their discussion of model inversion with
the statement that “model inversion produces the average of
the features that at best can characterize an entire output
class.” Thus, model inversion is of some interest in the
specific context of our paper, which focuses on class-wide
unlearning (and hence implicitly makes the assumption that
a single individual owns all data for an entire output class).
We experiment with model inversion in section V-E, see also
figure 1.
Differential privacy. Differential privacy [15], [26], [27]
limits the influence of individual training points on a model in
a precise probabilistic way. We briefly remark that (differen-
tial) privacy and data deletion may be considered orthogonal
problems, in the sense that private models need not support
efficient deletion, and models supporting efficient deletion
need not be private. [10] discuss this point in additional detail.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION.
In this section we formalize our notion of unlearning.
Notation. For a vector v ∈ Rk we use indices ranging from
0 to (k − 1) to denote its entries, i.e. v = (v0, v1, . . . vk−1)>.
One dimensional vector are always column vectors.
For a vector of logits ` ∈ Rk let
σi∗(`) =
exp(`i∗)∑
i<k exp(`i)
∈ [0, 1], for all i∗ < k
XRp
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Fig. 2. Schematic representation of σ ◦h, for a classifier h = W ◦ f in the
hypothesis class considered throughout this paper. Here f denotes a feature
extraction, W is a linear transformation and σ is the softmax function. In
deep learning terminology “Logits” represents a fully connected layer with
k units and weights W .
and σ(`) = (σ0(`), σ1(`), . . . , σk−1(`)). We call σ the softmax
function.
We use uppercase, boldface letters for random variables. If
R is a random variable P (R) denotes its distribution.
Classification. We consider a multiclass classification
problem: Let X be a random variable taking values in
some input space X (e.g. X = R28×28), and let Y be a
random variable representing class labels taking values in
Y = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} for some natural number k > 2, with
some joint data generating distribution P (X,Y).
Given x ∈ X , a classifier h : X → Rk for this classification
problem attempts to estimate logits ` = h(x) such that
σ(`) ≈ P (Y | X = x).
Hypothesis class. In this paper we consider the class H of
all classifiers h of the form
h = logistic regression ◦ feature extraction,
i.e. classifiers that can be decomposed into a (potentially non-
linear) feature extraction followed by a multinomial logistic
regression.
More formally any h ∈ H can be expressed as
h : x 7→W · f(x) (1)
where f : X → Rp denotes the feature extraction, p
denotes the dimension of the feature space, W is a (k × p)-
matrix representing a linear transformation Rp → Rk, and
σ denotes the softmax function. Figure 2 shows a schematic
representation of the elements of H. To simplify notation we
do not consider affine transformations, i.e. classifiers of the
form h : x 7→ W · f(x) + b for some b ∈ Rk. However, we
remark that our method is easily adapted to this case.
Observe that in particular all deep neural networks for
which the output is a densely connected layer with softmax
activations fit into the schema discussed in this section.
Learning algorithms. For a finite training set
D ⊆ X × Y , a learning algorithm A calculates a classifier
h = A(D) ∈ H.
Note that if A is non-deterministic A(D) can be considered
a random variable taking values in H.
Unlearning of classes. Let C ( Y be a set of classes,
which we want to unlearn. Consider the multiclass classifi-
cation problem for the distribution P (X,Y | Y 6∈ C), i.e.
the original problem with the classes C removed. We define
the hypothesis class H¬C for this problem similarly to H, i.e.
h ∈ H¬C is of form (1) with W a ((k − |C|) × p)-Matrix.
For D ⊆ X × Y let D¬C = {(x, y) ∈ D : y 6∈ C} and
let A¬C(D¬C) ∈ H¬C denote a classifier calculated by some
learning algorithm A¬C .
Definition III.1 (Unlearning). We say that a map
D : H → H¬C
“unlearns C from H with respect to A,A¬C , D” if the random
variablesD(A(D)) andA¬C(D¬C) have the same distribution
over H¬C . We call D an unlearning operation (for C).
Weak unlearning of classes. A good choice of D will
of course depend on the learning algorithm A. We mostly
concern ourselves with the case where A trains a neural
network with a densely connected output layer with softmax
activations. Unfortunately it is difficult to understand how a
neural network represents knowledge internally (e.g. [28]),
hence unlearning as defined above may currently be out
of reach. We therefore propose a weakening of the above
definition.
Definition III.2 (Weak unlearning). As before let D be a
map H → HC and for X (taking values in the input space
X according to the data generating distribution) consider the
random variables
Lseen = h0(X), where h0 = D(A(D))
L¬seen = h1(X), where h1 = A¬C(D¬C)
i.e. the logit outputs of the respective classifiers, taking values
in Rk−|C|. We say that “D weakly unlearns C from H
with respect to A,A¬C , D” if Lseen and L¬seen have the
same distribution over Rk−|C|. We call D a weak unlearning
operation (for C).
Fact III.3. If D is an unlearning operation, then D is a weak
unlearning operation.
Discussion. Definition III.1 demands that the distributions
over the hypothesis class (i.e. in practical terms the parameter
space) are the same, while III.2 relaxes this to the distributions
over the output space being the same. Intuitively speaking:
III.1 demands D make the model h “look as if h had never
seen the data”, while III.2 demands D make the outputs of
h “look as if h had never seen the data” We may therefore
consider unlearning (in the strong sense) to be a white-box
variant and unlearning in the weak sense to be a black-box
variant of the definition of unlearning. See section VI for
further discussion.
Abusing the terminology introduced in this section we
refer to maps D that roughly fit definitions III.1 and III.2,
respectively in the sense that they make the relevant distribu-
tions similar in an appropriate divergence measure, as “good”,
“satisfactorily performing”, etc. unlearning operations.
IV. METHOD
In this section we propose an intuitive weak unlearning
operation D for classes, exploiting the special structure of el-
ements of H. In our experiments in section V we demonstrate
that D performs satisfactorily for neural networks.
A. Definition of weak unlearning operation Dz
For simplicity of notation let C = {0}, i.e. we are going
to unlearn class 0. However our method easily generalizes to
arbitrary C. Let h = W ◦ f ∈ H be a classifier. For j < k let
aj = E[h(X) | Y = j] ∈ Rk
be the expected prediction for class j, and let
A =
(
a0 | a1 | · · · | ak−1
)
∈ Rk×k .
In practice, we may estimate aj from the training data. Next,
define a map pi such that for v = (v0, v1, . . . , vk−1)> ∈ Rk we
have pi(v) = (v1, v2, . . . , vk−1)>. For arbitrary z ∈ R(n−1) let
Bz =
(
z | pi(a1) | pi(a2) | · · · | pi(ak−1)
)
∈ R(k−1)×k .
Let Fz = BzA−1 and note that Fz represents the linear
transformation which maps the j-th row of A to the j-th row
of Bz . We call Fz a filtration matrix. Let
Wz = FzW ∈ R(k−1)×p .
Finally, we define a new classifier
hz : x 7→Wz · f(x).
Our unlearning operation is thus
Dz :
{
H → H¬C
h 7→ hz.
We call Dz a linear filtration.
Note that Dz replaces W by Wz = FzW , hence after
applying Dz we may delete W . This means that, even though
our unlearning operation essentially filters the outputs of
the original classifier, the linearity of the filtering operations
allows us to absorb the filter into the classifier. This is
an important feature in a situation were it may longer be
permissible to store the original classifier.
So how do we choose z ∈ Rk−1?
I Naive unlearning. z = pi(a0). This gives Fz = (0 |
Ik−1), i.e. Fz = pi. Intuitively, we may think of this choice
as simply cutting the output unit associated with C out off the
classifier. We call this unlearning operation the naive method
and will use it as a baseline to measure the improvements
other methods provide.
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Fig. 3. The probability distribution predicted for class “airplane” after its
unlearning by either normalization or randomization from models trained on
CIFAR-10, compared to models retrained without class “airplane”. The bars
are centered around the mean and have length of the standard deviation, over
100 models.
I Normalization.
z = pi(a0)− 1
k − 1
∑
1≤i<k
(a0)i +
1
(k − 1)2
∑
1≤i,j<k
(aj)i.
This means we shift pi(a0) such that its mean becomes the
mean of the remaining rows of Bz . The intuition behind this
choice of z is that we would like inputs of the class in C
to be misclassified in a “natural” way. We base this method
on the assumption that the values in pi(a0) encode a natural
distribution for predictions of the class in C. However, we
expect the values in pi(a0) to be unnaturally low (absolutely
speaking), hence we shift them. We refer to this method as
normalization or normalizing filtration. It is the main method
we propose. Figure 3 agrees with the intuition described above:
the bars for normalization line up nicely with the bars of the
retrained models, while the bars of randomization do not.
For comparison we define two more methods.
I Randomization. z ∼ N (0, Ik−1). We sample z from
a multivariate normal distribution. We refer to this method as
randomization.
I Zeroing. z = 0. We refer to this method as zeroing.
B. Computational Complexity of Dz
To find Dz we need to compute the following: 1) A, i.e. the
expected predictions for all k classes; 2) A−1, the inversion
of a (k×k)-Matrix; 3) z, in case z has a non-trivial definition
(e.g. computing a sample of N ); 4) Fz , the multiplication of a
((k−1)×k) with a (k×k)-Matrix; 5) Wz , the multiplication
of a ((k − 1)× k) with a (k × p)-Matrix.
In practice 1) will incur the majority of the computational
costs, while 2)-5) will be negligible. Thus, if we estimate A by
predicting ` samples per class the computational complexity
of finding Dz(h) is ` · k times the complexity of computing
a prediction of h. We find that Dz is robust in respect to the
quality of the estimation of A, hence a small amount of sample
points per class suffice, see section V-D.
Note that the costs incurred by linear filtration are virtually
the same for several concurrent deletion requests: we just
need to change Bz appropriately, e.g. if we want to delete
class 3 in addition to class 0 we need to replace pi(a3) in
column 3 with some z3. The only additional costs incurred
are the computation of z3 (which for our proposed methods
are negligible).
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Evaluation method
By definition III.2 the quality of a weak unlearning oper-
ation depends on the similarity of the resulting distributions
P (Lseen) and P (L¬seen). We begin by defining a divergence
measure for distributions based on the Bayes error rate. This
then motivates us to empirically evaluate the performance of
the unlearning operations proposed in section IV by training
binary classifiers on the pre-softmax outputs of our models.
Classifier advantage. Let B be a Bernoulli random
variable uniformly taking values in {0, 1}. Let
U = Lseen · (1−B) + L¬seen ·B
be the mixture of Lseen and L¬seen. Let
b : dom(U)→ {0, 1}
be a binary classifier operating on the mixture U and define
αb = 2
(
E[P (B = b(U) | U)]− 1
2
)
. (2)
We call αb the classifier advantage of b. Intuitively speaking,
αb is a measure for how good b is at telling the mixture U
apart. Let
b∗ : u 7→ argmax
i<2
P (B = i | U = u)
be the Bayes optimal classifier for P (U,B) Then αb∗ ∈ [0, 1]
and it is a measure for the difference between P (Lseen) and
P (L¬seen), based on how much better the Bayes optimal
classifier b∗ performs than random guessing. A value of αb∗
close to 0 indicates that P (Lseen) and P (L¬seen) are similar.
Experimental setup. Assume that b∗ can be approximated
sufficiently well by a classifier b derived via a state-of-the-
art binary classification algorithm. Then αb approximates αb∗ ,
hence we consider a low value of αb to be evidence for the
similarity of the distributions of Lseen and L¬seen. Note that
even if we do not believe that b approximates b∗ well, we may
still use αb as a relative performance measure for different
unlearning operations.
Drawing i.i.d. samples from P (Lseen) and P (L¬seen) is
computationally expensive as it requires us to run the algo-
rithms A(D) respectively A¬C(D¬C) for every sample point.
In our experiments we thus take a pragmatic approach. We
train 100 models which get to see the full training data and
100 models which get to see the training data with C removed,
i.e. models that unlearned by retraining from scratch. We then
apply our unlearning operation to each of the models that got
to see the full training data. For every single model we then
calculate the predictions for the full test data by that model,
without applying the softmax activations of the output layer.
We label the predictions made by models that originally got
to see the full training data with “seen” and predictions made
by models which never got to see the training data for C as
“not seen”.
Finally, we train a binary classifier b that given a prediction
attempts to predict its label “seen” or “not seen”. For this
purpose we use the predictions of 70 models of either category
as training data and the predictions of the remaining 30 models
of either category as test data. Figure 4 shows a schematic
representation of our setup. In practice, we train a separate
binary classifier on the predictions of each class.
Note the subtle difference of our setup to the shadow model
setup of [22], where the authors ask their binary classifier
(there “attack model”): “Do these outputs look like they come
from a member of the training set?”, and hope for an accurate
answer, such that their membership inference attack succeeds.
We ask our binary classifier: “Do these outputs look like
they come from a model that has seen C?”, and hope for an
inaccurate answer, as we hope that our unlearning operation
prevents the attack.
B. Data
MNIST The MNIST dataset [29] contains 70,000 28×28
images of handwritten digits in 10 classes, with 7,000 images
per class, split into 60,000 training and 10,000 test images.
CIFAR-10 The CIFAR-10 dataset [30] contains 60,000
32×32×3 images in 10 classes, with 6,000 images per class,
split into 50,000 training and 10,000 test images.
AT&T Faces The AT&T Laboratories Cambridge
Database of Faces [31] contains 400 92×112 images of 40
subjects, with 10 images per subject.
C. Network Architectures
MLP For the MNIST dataset, we evaluate our unlearning
method on a multilayer perceptron (MLP), with one hidden
layer of 50 units.
CNN For the CIFAR-10 dataset, we evaluate our unlearn-
ing method on convolutional neural networks (CNNs). Our
networks consist of two convolutional (with 16 respectively
32 3×3 filters) and two max-pooling layers, followed by
a fully connected layer with p units with rectified linear
activations and a softmax output layer. We experiment with
p ∈ {64, 256, 1024}. Note that our unlearning operation works
by manipulating W ∈ Rk×p, thus we want to investigate how
the size of W affects unlearning performance.
ResNet For the AT&T faces dataset we evaluate our
unlearning method on a residual neural network architecture
[32]. We use a convolutional layer (with 8 5×5 filters),
followed by 5 downsampling residual blocks (with 2i+3 3×3
filters in the i-th block), followed by global max-pooling and
a softmax output layer.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 100
Model 1 with C unlearned
Model 2 with C unlearned
Model 100 with C unlearned
“seen” pre-softmax predictions 1
“seen” pre-softmax predictions 2
“seen” pre-softmax predictions 100
“not seen” pre-softmax predictions 1
“not seen” pre-softmax predictions 2
“not seen” pre-softmax predictions 100
Model 1
Model 2
Model 100
Full training data
Training data without C
Attack model
train()
train()
unlearn() predict()
predict()
train()
Fig. 4. Experimental setup: On the full training data we train 100 models by A = train(). To these models we then apply an unlearning operation
D = unlearn(). We then predict() our test data for each of these models and label these predictions “seen”. On the training data with C removed
we train 100 models by A¬C = train(). We then predict() our test data for each of these models and label these predictions “not seen”. Finally,
we use all labeled predictions as the training/test data of a binary classifier b, which we employ as our “attack model”. We interpret low test accuracy of b
as evidence for good performance of a weak unlearning operation.
TABLE I
Classifier advantage for 1 unlearned and 9 remaining classes, for MLPs
trained on MNIST.
UNLEARNED NN RF AB
NAIVE 0.593 0.609 0.641
NORMALIZATION 0.327 0.362 0.438
REMAINING NN RF AB
NAIVE 0.048 0.090 0.098
NORMALIZATION 0.041 0.089 0.095
D. Results
We experiment with the following classification algorithms:
nearest neighbors (NN), random forests (RF), and AdaBoost
(AB). For the models trained on MNIST and CIFAR-10 we
unlearn the first class (of 10) in the dataset (the digit “zero”
and the class “airplane”, respectively). For the models trained
on AT&T Faces we unlearn the first 4 individuals (of 40) in
the dataset.
Table I shows classifier advantages (remember formula (2))
for the MLPs trained on MNIST. We observe a significant
decrease of advantage when unlearning by normalization
compared to the naive method for the unlearned class, and
similar advantage for the remaining classes. Table II shows
classifier advantages for the CNNs trained on CIFAR-10 (with
p = 256). We observe a vast decrease of advantage when
TABLE II
Classifier advantage for 1 unlearned and 9 remaining classes, for CNNs
trained on CIFAR-10, with p = 256.
UNLEARNED NN RF AB
NAIVE 0.609 0.457 0.590
NORMALIZATION 0.146 0.110 0.093
RANDOMIZATION 0.634 0.579 0.582
ZEROING 0.642 0.566 0.575
REMAINING NN RF AB
NAIVE 0.115 0.080 0.109
NORMALIZATION 0.148 0.097 0.118
RANDOMIZATION 0.416 0.279 0.230
ZEROING 0.421 0.276 0.219
unlearning by normalization compared to the naive method for
the unlearned class, while randomization and zeroing do not
provide such benefits. Table III shows classifier advantages for
the residual networks trained on AT&T Faces. We observe a
slight decrease of advantage when unlearning by normalization
compared to the naive method for the unlearned classes, and
similar advantage for the remaining classes.
Effect of sample size. We investigate the effect of sample
size for estimating the matrix of mean predictions A (recall
section IV-A). Table IV shows the results for CNNs trained
on CIFAR-10 (with p = 256). Unlearning by normalization,
compared to the naive method, we observe a strong decrease
TABLE III
Classifier advantage for 4 unlearned and 36 remaining classes, for residual
networks trained on AT&T faces.
UNLEARNED NN RF AB
NAIVE 0.467 0.573 0.574
NORMALIZATION 0.381 0.454 0.462
REMAINING NN RF AB
NAIVE 0.149 0.266 0.245
NORMALIZATION 0.152 0.263 0.246
TABLE IV
Classifier advantage for CNNs trained on CIFAR-10, for different sample
size s per class, with p = 256.
UNLEARNED s NN RF AB
NAIVE - 0.609 0.457 0.590
NORMALIZATION 10 0.193 0.114 0.122
NORMALIZATION 100 0.156 0.095 0.111
NORMALIZATION 1000 0.146 0.110 0.093
REMAINING s NN RF AB
NAIVE - 0.115 0.080 0.109
NORMALIZATION 10 0.205 0.142 0.171
NORMALIZATION 100 0.169 0.108 0.136
NORMALIZATION 1000 0.148 0.097 0.118
of advantage for the unlearned class for a sample size of 10 per
class (1 andforasamplesizeof100perclass(10 we observe
performance comparable to the estimation based on the full
test data.
Effect of p. For the CNNs trained on CIFAR-10 we
investigate the effect of the number p of units in the fully con-
nected layer. Table V shows that unlearning by normalization
significantly decreases classifier advantage for all tested values
of p on the unlearned class. We observe a slight increase of
advantage for the remaining classes, that appears to get slightly
worse with p increasing.
Effect on classification accuracy. While implicit in
definition III.2, an important consideration for the design of
an unlearning operation is that we do not want to decrease the
performance of a classifier on the remaining classes. Table
VI reports the test images for which the most likely label
predicted was changed by one of our unlearning methods,
compared to the naive method. Normalization did not change
any labels (and thus in particular non of the correct ones).
Summary of experimental results. Normalization 1) de-
creased classifier advantage on the unlearned classes in all
three experiments 2) showed robustness with regards to sample
size for parameter estimation 3) performed well for different
TABLE V
Classifier advantage, for CNNs trained on CIFAR-10, for different numbers
p of units in the fully connected layer.
UNLEARNED p NN RF AB
NAIVE 64 0.290 0.321 0.380
NORMALIZATION 64 0.086 0.106 0.119
NAIVE 256 0.609 0.457 0.590
NORMALIZATION 256 0.146 0.110 0.093
NAIVE 1024 0.627 0.485 0.603
NORMALIZATION 1024 0.174 0.138 0.138
REMAINING p NN RF AB
NAIVE 64 0.040 0.043 0.044
NORMALIZATION 64 0.044 0.040 0.045
NAIVE 256 0.115 0.080 0.109
NORMALIZATION 256 0.148 0.097 0.118
NAIVE 1024 0.129 0.090 0.115
NORMALIZATION 1024 0.174 0.104 0.129
TABLE VI
The amount of labels changed in percent, when compared to the naive
method, for 100 models trained on CIFAR-10, and p = 256. The
“all”-column reports the value for predictions of the entire test set, the
“unl.”-column for predictions of images of the unlearned class, and the
“cor.”-column for predictions of images of the remaining classes that are
correctly predicted by the naive method. The “acc.”-column shows the mean
classification accuracy.
DELETION METHOD ALL UNL. COR. ACC
NAIVE - - - 69.2
NORMALIZATION 0.0 0.0 0.0 69.2
RANDOMIZATION 20.1 48.8 11.8 64.8
ZEROING 18.3 45.4 10.3 65.7
dimensions of the feature space, and 4) did not negatively
affect classification accuracy.
E. Model inversion
Figure 1 and figure 5 show the results of a “model inversion
attack”, i.e. gradient ascend on the input space for a model
trained on AT&T Database of Faces. We use a neural network
consisting of two fully connected layers with 1000 and 300
units respectively with sigmoid activations and a softmax
output layer.
Visually, naive unlearning barely affects the quality of the
reconstruction for any of the classes (in particular not the
unlearned class). On the other hand the normalization method
greatly disturbs the reconstruction of the unlearned class, while
barely affecting the remaining classes. In accordance with our
discussion of model inversion in section II, we thus interpret
figure 1 as visual evidence suggesting a desirable effect of
TABLE VII
KSΦ for Φ consisting of 1000 unit vectors pointing in uniform random
directions. (Lower values are better.)
UNLEARNED CIFAR-10 MNIST
NAIVE .115 .184
NORMALIZATION .038 .1
BASELINE .015 .017
REMAINING CIFAR-10 MNIST
NAIVE .037 .034
NORMALIZATION .038 .034
BASELINE .013 .023
our normalization method on the correlation between input
and output space represented by our model. We leave a more
detailed investigation of this phenomenon for future work.
F. Random direction KolmogorovSmirnov statistics
Given Φ ⊆ Rk−|C|, and having drawn samples S1, S2 from
P (Lseen) and P (L¬seen) respectively in the fashion described
in section V-A, we compute the statistic
KSΦ(S1, S2) =
1
|Φ|
∑
φ∈Φ
KStwo sample(φ · S1, φ · S2). (3)
Here KStwo sample denotes the two-sample KolmogorovS-
mirnov statistic and φ ·S is shorthand for {φ ·s : s ∈ S} ⊆ R.
Table VII reports the KSφ statistic for Φ consisting of
1000 unit vectors pointing in uniform random directions. We
compare naive unlearning to normalizing filtration for the
CIFAR-10 experiment employing CNNs (p = 256), and the
MNIST experiment employing MLPs. As noted in section V-A
the samples we draw are not i.i.d., hence we also report a
baseline KSφ statistic computed from two independent batches
of 100 models trained without the class we unlearn.
The results paint a picture similar to section V-D. In
both experiments normalizing filtration decreases KSΦ for
the unlearned class, with somewhat better performance in the
CIFAR-10 experiment, while the KSΦ remains unchanged for
the remaining classes.
VI. DISCUSSION
In section III we made a didactic choice to introduce the
special hypothesis class H (which permitted absorption of
the filtration operation) before defining unlearning. It should
however be clear how definitions III.1 and III.2 are appli-
cable to any class of classifiers, and in the somewhat more
common setting of deletion requests of single data points.
We would like to emphasize our belief that in the light of
the non-deterministic nature of many learning algorithms a
probabilistic definition of unlearning, such as chosen in [10]
(there “deletion”) and our work, is necessary.
For contrast let us consider the definition of unlearning in
[11] that asks to find a model that “could have been obtained”
Fig. 5. Model inversion for a toy model trained on the AT&T Faces dataset
with 4 classes. The top row shows one training image of each class, the
second row reconstructions of classes by model inversion, the third row
reconstructions after naive unlearning of the class in the first column, the
bottom row reconstructions after unlearning the class in the first column by
normalizing filtration. See figure 6 for the remaining classes.
without looking at the deleted training data. Since all models
on discrete digital systems necessarily have a finite parameter
space we very much could obtain any model without looking
at any data by guessing its parameters. What happened here?
Guessing a model’s parameters can be considered drawing
a sample from a uniform distribution over the parameter
space. On the other hand a probabilistic definition such as
III.1 requires the distribution over the parameter space to be
the same as if we had run the original learning algorithm
without using the deleted data, which for reasonable learning
algorithms is certainly not uniform. If we would like to stick
to an informal definition we should therefore say that a model
“could have been obtained, with reasonable likelihood”.
We further conclude that it is an important consideration
whether a definition of unlearning makes sense when not
read in a benevolent way (e.g. by a party whose interest
in unlearning stems from of legal obligation). In fact our
definition of weak unlearning III.2, i.e. unlearning in a black-
box sense, suffers from a similar issue. A malicious way
to define a weak unlearning operations D is the following:
for any classifier h, simply train a new classifier h′ without
using the deleted data, then define D(h) = h′′ = (h, h′),
where h′′(x) = h′(x). The outputs of D(h) look exactly like
those of h′, thus D is indeed an unlearning operation in the
black-box sense, however we never actually deleted h. Let us
thus emphasize that the weak definition of unlearning is only
applicable when acting in good faith.
VII. CONCLUSION
We considered the problem of unlearning in a class-wide
setting, for classifiers predicting logits. We developed nor-
malizing filtration as an unlearning method, with compelling
visual results (figure 6). These are backed up by good ex-
perimental results with regards to to our proposed definition
of weak unlearning and our metrics of classifier advantage
(2) and the KSΦ statistic (3). We emphasize once again the
black-box nature of weak unlearning, entailing the black-box
nature of our proposed unlearning operation. While linear
filtration can be absorbed into the final layer of a classifier
(for the hypothesis class considered), our approach remains
somewhat limited with regards to its shallowness. In future
work we hope to find methods that allow for deeper absorp-
tion, thus hopefully leading to stronger privacy guarantees.
On the other hand our method’s intuitive simplicity nicely
complements concurrent approaches such as [14], [17], [18].
Another promising direction may be to enhance our method
by some form of shrinkage of the logits, in case the unlearned
class constitutes a large part of the misclassifications of one
of the remaining classes. Finally it should be noted that, while
the “right to be forgotten” inspired our research, whether our
approach is adequate in this context is for legal scholars to
decide.
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Fig. 6. Model inversion for a toy model trained on the AT&T Faces dataset with 4 classes. On the left side we show results for naive unlearning, on the
right side for normalizing filtration. On either side: The top row shows one training image of each class, the second row reconstructions of classes by model
inversion, the (i+ 2)-th row shows the reconstructions after unlearning the class in the i-th column by the respective unlearning operation.
APPENDIX
More complete versions of tables from section V-D.
A. MNIST – MLP experiment
TABLE VIII
Accuracy (in percent) and cross-entropy loss, mean ± standard deviation, for 100 MLPs trained on MNIST. p is the number of units in the fully connected
layer, i.e. the dimension of the feature space. s is the sample size per class, used to estimate the mean predictions.
UNLEARNED NN RF AB
NAIVE 0.593 0.609 0.641
NORMALIZATION 0.327 0.362 0.438
RANDOMIZATION 0.910 0.869 0.902
ZEROING 0.919 0.886 0.909
REMAINING NN RF AB
NAIVE 0.048 0.090 0.098
NORMALIZATION 0.041 0.089 0.095
RANDOMIZATION 0.116 0.132 0.133
ZEROING 0.119 0.129 0.132
TABLE IX
Classifier advantage for 1 unlearned and 9 remaining classes, for MLPs trained on MNIST. p is the number of units in the fully connected layer, i.e. the
dimension of the feature space. s is the sample size per class, used to estimate the mean predictions.
ACCURACY LOSS
BEFORE UNLEARNING 97.1 ± 0.19 0.10 ± 0.01
BASELINE MODEL 97.1 ± 0.18 0.09 ± 0.01
NAIVE 97.1 ± 0.20 0.10 ± 0.01
NORMALIZATION 97.1 ± 0.20 0.10 ± 0.01
RANDOMIZATION 96.7 ± 0.33 0.11 ± 0.01
ZEROING 96.7 ± 0.30 0.11 ± 0.01
B. CIFAR10 – CNN experiment
TABLE X
Classifier advantage for 1 unlearned and 9 remaining classes, for CNNs trained on CIFAR-10. p is the number of units in the fully connected layer, i.e. the
dimension of the feature space. s is the sample size per class, used to estimate the mean predictions.
UNLEARNED p s NN RF AB
NAIVE 64 - 0.290 0.331 0.380
NORMALIZATION 64 10 0.113 0.135 0.137
NORMALIZATION 64 100 0.089 0.105 0.129
NORMALIZATION 64 - 0.086 0.106 0.119
RANDOMIZATION 64 - 0.547 0.487 0.528
ZEROING 64 - 0.599 0.534 0.560
NAIVE 256 - 0.609 0.457 0.590
NORMALIZATION 256 10 0.193 0.114 0.122
NORMALIZATION 256 100 0.156 0.095 0.111
NORMALIZATION 256 - 0.146 0.110 0.093
RANDOMIZATION 256 - 0.634 0.579 0.582
ZEROING 256 - 0.642 0.566 0.575
NAIVE 1024 - 0.627 0.485 0.603
NORMALIZATION 1024 10 0.230 0.164 0.179
NORMALIZATION 1024 100 0.216 0.157 0.172
NORMALIZATION 1024 - 0.174 0.138 0.138
RANDOMIZATION 1024 - 0.741 0.637 0.682
ZEROING 1024 - 0.746 0.642 0.680
REMAINING p s NN RF AB
NAIVE 64 - 0.040 0.043 0.044
NORMALIZATION 64 10 0.072 0.075 0.080
NORMALIZATION 64 100 0.047 0.044 0.047
NORMALIZATION 64 - 0.044 0.040 0.045
RANDOMIZATION 64 - 0.240 0.203 0.174
ZEROING 64 - 0.246 0.204 0.163
NAIVE 256 - 0.115 0.080 0.109
NORMALIZATION 256 10 0.205 0.142 0.171
NORMALIZATION 256 100 0.169 0.108 0.136
NORMALIZATION 256 - 0.148 0.097 0.118
RANDOMIZATION 256 - 0.416 0.279 0.230
ZEROING 256 - 0.421 0.276 0.219
NAIVE 1024 - 0.129 0.090 0.115
NORMALIZATION 1024 10 0.242 0.149 0.182
NORMALIZATION 1024 100 0.217 0.128 0.146
NORMALIZATION 1024 - 0.174 0.097 0.118
RANDOMIZATION 1024 - 0.506 0.309 0.249
ZEROING 1024 - 0.508 0.310 0.251
TABLE XI
Accuracy (in percent) and cross-entropy loss, mean ± standard deviation, for 100 CNNs trained on CIFAR10. p is the number of units in the fully
connected layer, i.e. the dimension of the feature space. s is the sample size per class, used to estimate the mean predictions.
p s ACCURACY LOSS
BEFORE UNLEARNING 64 - 65.1 ± 1.01 1.01 ± 0.03
RETRAINING 64 - 66.0 ± 1.06 0.96 ± 0.03
NAIVE 64 - 66.4 ± 1.04 0.95 ± 0.03
NORMALIZATION 64 10 66.4 ± 1.04 0.95 ± 0.03
NORMALIZATION 64 100 66.4 ± 1.04 0.95 ± 0.03
NORMALIZATION 64 - 66.4 ± 1.04 0.95 ± 0.03
RANDOMIZATION 64 - 61.1 ± 2.08 1.17 ± 0.10
ZEROING 64 - 62.3 ± 1.76 1.12 ± 0.09
BEFORE UNLEARNING 256 - 68.1 ± 0.85 0.93 ± 0.02
RETRAINING 256 - 69.2 ± 0.80 0.89 ± 0.02
NAIVE 256 - 69.2 ± 0.83 0.88 ± 0.02
NORMALIZATION 256 10 69.2 ± 0.83 0.88 ± 0.02
NORMALIZATION 256 100 69.2 ± 0.83 0.88 ± 0.02
NORMALIZATION 256 - 69.2 ± 0.83 0.88 ± 0.02
RANDOMIZATION 256 - 64.9 ± 1.76 1.07 ± 0.08
ZEROING 256 - 65.7 ± 1.40 1.03 ± 0.06
BEFORE UNLEARNING 1024 - 69.7 ± 0.81 0.93 ± 0.03
RETRAINING 1024 - 70.5 ± 0.82 0.88 ± 0.03
NAIVE 1024 - 70.7 ± 0.82 0.88 ± 0.03
NORMALIZATION 1024 10 70.7 ± 0.82 0.88 ± 0.03
NORMALIZATION 1024 100 70.7 ± 0.82 0.88 ± 0.03
NORMALIZATION 1024 - 70.7 ± 0.82 0.88 ± 0.03
RANDOMIZATION 1024 - 67.1 ± 1.55 1.06 ± 0.08
ZEROING 1024 - 67.6 ± 1.16 1.03 ± 0.05
